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 This appeal is filed by Thomas G. Martin, M.D. (“Dr. Martin” or “Appellant”), due 
to the early termination of his employment and revocation of his medical privileges, while 
employed at the University of Utah.  In August of 2013, Dr. Martin entered into his first 
contract with the Department of Pharmacotherapy to act as the full-time Medical Director 
at the Utah Poison Control Center (the “UPCC”), which started on October 1, of 2013, and 
where he performed those duties for eight (8) months. R. at 00043 – 00047.  In February 
of 2014, Dr. Martin entered into a second contract relating to a “split position with [his] 
primary appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, to 
start July 1, 2014[,]” through June 30, of 2015.  R. 00051 – 00053.  Dr. Martin’s second 
contract was rescinded unexpectedly in May of 2014.  R. at 00312.  At the same time, the 
Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine, Dr. Barton (who had spearheaded the idea 
of having a split position for the Medical Director at the UPCC) announced that he would 
be leaving. R. at 02318, 02425, and 02648. Dr. Barton was asked to make any reductions 
in the budget of the Division of Emergency Medicine before he left in June of 2014.  R. at 
02433.  There were concerns regarding funding to pay for Dr. Martin when he transitioned 
and whether the clinical shifts would be available.  R. at 02374, and 02390.  The University 
of Utah and its individual employees’ (the “University” or “Defendants/Appellees”) 
actions caused harm and unfair surprise to Dr. Martin.    
 Thereafter, Dr. Martin proceeded with litigation against the University, where 
ultimately at the state court level, the trial court denied Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary 





Summary Judgment, as reflected in the Honorable Andrew H. Stone’s Memorandum 
Decision of September 26, 2017 (“Memorandum Decision”), and subsequent Order entered 
on November 17, 2017 (“Final Order”). R. at 03135 – 03145.1 
 The trial court’s ruling should be reversed because in granting the University’s 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court: 1. Failed to follow the standards 
required under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c), when there were disputed issues over material 
facts and those facts or reasonable inferences were not viewed in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, Dr. Martin (R. at 03136 – 01343); 2. Despite the heavily disputed 
and conflicting material facts in the record, the trial court made improper factual 
determinations regarding the material terms of the contracts in favor of the University, and 
did not address the lack of good faith or fair dealing claim as a result (R. 03137 – 03144); 
and, 3.  Finally, the trial court improperly weighed and only considered the University’s 
claims (that were not raised until after the termination had occurred) that University staff 
had made an “error” in issuing clinical privileges and active medical staff appointment to 
Dr. Martin, (R. at 03136 – 03144), and which Dr. Martin wholeheartedly disputed as the 
active medical appointment with inpatient privileges was a requirement of his first signed 
contract letter from August 15, 2013 (R. at 00046), not to mention a fundamental 
                                              
1  See the Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants’ Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, (the “Final Order”) entered on November 17, 2017, by the 
trial court, and attached hereto in the Addendum. The Final Order was not entered by the 
trial court until after this Court filed a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition.  The 
University’s counsel had not previously submitted a proposed order as requested by the 
trial court that was consistent with its Memorandum Decision.  After Dr. Martin submitted 





requirement of the UPPC, to remain an accredited poison control center with the American 
Association of Poison Control Centers (“AAPCC”). R. at 02960 – 02962.  Although the 
record reflects that the University’s actions caused unfair surprise and extreme harm to Dr. 
Martin, the trial court supported the University’s unilateral rescission of the second 
employment offer (deeming it was not even a contract) without any due process to Dr. 
Martin. R. at 03138 – 03142.  The trial court incorrectly made a determination that Dr. 
Martin had no vested interest or property interest in the clinical privileges or medical staff 
appointment given to him the year before (despite referring to the contested position of 
both parties)(R. 03140), and ignored the material facts in the record, or the Policy and 
Bylaw provisions referenced by Dr. Martin, and failed to grant all reasonable inferences in 
favor of Dr. Martin as the non-moving party. R. at 03140 – 03141.    
 As a result, Dr. Martin respectfully asks that this Court reverse the trial court and 
remand the case back with instructions permitting Dr. Martin to proceed forward to trial.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
FIRST ISSUE:  Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final Order, 
should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court failed to apply the correct standard 
in granting the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment despite genuine disputes 
over material facts and without considering all the facts or reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to Dr. Martin?  
 Standard of Review:  The standard of review for a dismissal under Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c) is correctness, and an appellate court: “[R]eviews a trial court's ‘legal conclusions 





facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.’” 2  A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no 
material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).3  “Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 56(c)”4 
 Preservation:  This issue was preserved in Dr. Martin’s Joint Reply Memorandum 
in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability against the University and 
Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
02959 – 03034, at 02947 – 02948, 02957), the University’s Joint Memorandum in 
Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Dr. Martin’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852, at 01817-01819) , and at oral argument (R. 03190 
- 03250, at 03208, and 03231-03235).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
SECOND ISSUE:  Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final 
Order, should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court improperly weighed 
conflicting facts in favor of the University, to determine that a contract did not culminate 
from the December 2013 signed acceptance letter between the University and Dr. Martin, 
and that Dr. Martin’s actions “failed to fulfill the fundamental conditions of the offer” 
                                              
2 See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
lso See also Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)(overruled on 
other grounds by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64).  
3  See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 10 (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Lauder, 
2010 UT App 216, ¶ 4 (internal citations omitted).  





sufficient to warrant the unilateral rescission of the second employment contract by the 
University?  
Standard of Review:  The standard of review is correctness, and the appellate court 
reviews:  “[A] district court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary 
judgment for correctness.”5   In Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, this Court further 
held as follows: “A condition is ‘an event, not certain to occur, which must occur ... before 
performance under a contract becomes due.’ ” … . Because “no duties arise between the 
contracting parties until the condition has been fulfilled,”[], failure of “ ‘a material 
condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform,’” … Whether a condition 
precedent was fulfilled generally presents a question of fact.”6 
Preservation:  This issue was preserved in Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Liability against the University (R. 00166 - 00323, at 00171 – 00175, 00186 
- 00189), the University’s Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852, 
at 01843-01847) , and at oral argument (R. 03190 - 03250, at 03209 - 03212).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
THIRD ISSUE:  Whether the trial court’s Memorandum Decision and Final Order, 
should be reversed and remanded, where the trial court held that Utah Courts do not 
recognize a physician’s constitutionally protected property interest right relative to 
employment or medical staff privileges, but even if recognized, that Dr. Martin suffered no 
                                              
5  See Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis 
added).   
6  See Id. at ¶ 8(internal citations omitted)(emphasis added); See also McArthur v. State 





procedural due process violation in this case because “the defense maintains that this letter 
[granting Dr. Martin active medical staff privileges] was issued in error” and the 
University’s unilateral mistake (and that was only raised after Dr. Martin had been actually 
acting as the Medical Director for eight months at the UPCC) apparently justified rescission 
of the contract, despite the unfair harm to Dr. Martin?   
Standard of Review:  The standard of review is both correctness and a clearly 
erroneous standard.  “Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are 
questions of law that we review for correctness... However, because [these questions 
require] the application of facts in the record to the due process standard, we incorporate 
a clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual determinations.”. … 
Procedural due process claims are evaluated under a two-part test.  The first question is 
“whether the [complaining party] has been deprived of a protected interest” in property or 
liberty. … If the court finds deprivation of a protected interest, we consider whether the 
procedures at issue comply with due process. Id.”7 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the Memorandum Decision (R. 03135 – 
03145, at 03136, 03140 - 03141), Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability 
against the University (R. 00166 - 00323, at 00183 – 00186), the University’s Joint 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Dr. 
Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 01760 – 01852, at 01820-01840), Dr. Martin’s 
Joint Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability 
                                              
7  See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, at ¶¶ 47-48 





against the University and Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 02918 – 02958, at 02934 – 02935, 02948 – 02954), and at oral 
argument (R. 03190 - 03250, at 03193 - 03208).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Relevant Facts 
1. Dr. Martin is a physician Board Certified in Emergency Medicine and 
Preventative Medicine (Occupational) and Medical Toxicology.  In addition, Dr. Martin 
has been recognized by the American College of Emergency Physicians for thirty (30) 
years of continuous Board Certification. R. at 00006.   
2. On August 2, 2013, Dr. Martin was offered the position of the Medical 
Director for the UPCC, with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy at the rank 
of Associate Professor (Clinical), at the University of Utah.  R. at 00043.  The position was 
anticipated to “transition to a split position with your primary academic appointment in 
the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, to start July 1, 2014.”  See 
Id. (emphasis added).  The proposed start date was October 1, 2013. R. at 00043 – 44; See 
also Memorandum Decision, R. 03135 – 03145, at 03135 – 03136. 8   
                                              
8  Dr. Martin recognizes that pursuant to State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, he is not required 
to marshal every scrap of evidence to support the trial court’s specific factual 
determinations that he is challenging herein, but rather, for persuasive purpose, Dr. Martin 
is providing facts as well as inferences, that were favorable to him but that the trial court 
did not include or misstated.  Dr. Martin is aware that the Supreme Court of Utah has: 
“repudiate[d] the default notion of marshaling sometimes put forward in our cases and 
reaffirm[ed] the traditional principle of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant’s 
burden of persuasion.” See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 41.  In addition, Dr. Martin is 
also aware that under the Advisory Committee Notes on the 2017 Amendments to Rule 24, 





3. The “split position” was unusual, (R. at 02419), and had never been done 
before at the University to Ms. Thompson’s knowledge (R. at 03047); however, it was an 
idea spearheaded by the then Chief of the Emergency Medicine Division, Dr. Erik Barton, 
as he, along with Dr. Barbara Crouch, wanted the Department of Pharmacotherapy and the 
UPCC to have a toxicology fellowship program jointly with the Department of Surgery.  
R. 02413 - 02414.  
4. On August 15, 2013, Dr. Martin received an updated letter for the same 
position.  R. 00046 – 00047, and 03136.  It had additional language, including that Dr. 
Martin had to obtain a license to practice medicine in the State of Utah “and a medical 
staff appointment at University Hospitals & Clinics.” R. at 00046 (emphasis added).   
5. It was necessary that Dr. Martin obtain his clinical privileges and a medical 
staff appointment at the University Hospital & Clinics because, (and as Dr. Martin asserted 
in his Declaration), the UPCC is an accredited poison center with the AAPCC, and to 
maintain accreditation it is required that: “The Medical Director and all other individuals 
designated as providers of medical direction must have medical staff appointments at an 
inpatient treatment facility”.[] R. at 02961. Furthermore, it is an AAPCC requirement that 
any Medical Director must be a practicing physician. R. at 01960.    
6. Dr. Martin accepted the offer in August of 2013. R at 03136.  
7. Thereafter, upon reliance of the signed offer and without knowledge of prior 
                                              
marshaling.  State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, holds that the failure to marshal 
is not a technical deficiency resulting in default, but is a manner in which an appellant may 
carry its burden of persuasion when challenging a finding or verdict.” See Rules App. Proc., 





discussions between Dr. Brixner and Dr. Crouch of the “temporary” nature of the position, 
Dr. Martin relocated from Seattle where he bought a condominium in Salt Lake City, and 
obtained his medical licenses in the State of Utah on September 6, 2013. R. at 00008. 
8. In September of 2014, Dr. Barton, informed Dr. Martin that the credentialing 
process for the Department of Surgery, Division of Emergency Medicine, would take “four 
to six months” to complete and that “[Rebecca] Bryce in the Division of Emergency 
Medicine would contact him about the application for an appointment in the Department 
of Surgery and for clinical privileges.[] R. at 01802.   
9. The record reflects that during the various application processes (of which 
there were at least four (4) different full applications) that would proceed over the following 
months , that Dr. Martin responded to over one hundred (100) e-mail exchanges in an effort 
to be responsive. R. at 02510. 
10. On October 1, 2013, Dr. Martin started as the full-time Medical Director at 
the UPCC. R. at 00008.   
11. On October 9, 2013, Dr. Martin’s credentialing application for his role as the 
Medical Director was approved by the University’s Credentialing Committee. R. at 00008.   
12. On October 16, 2013, a full copy of Dr. Martin’s application for credentialing 
with the Department of Pharmacotherapy was sent to Rebecca Bryce, an Administrative 
Assistant in the Division of Emergency Medicine, by Jeffrey Carter (with the exact same 
three letters of reference that would be sought by Ms. Bryce a few months later). R. at 
00008 – 00009.    





letter to Dr. Martin, advising him that, “the University’s Board of Trustees has approved 
your appointment in the full-time clinical track as Associate Professor (Clinical) of 
Pharmacotherapy, effective October 1, 2013 and ending June 30, 2014.” R. at 00009.  
14. On November 19, 2013, Dr. Martin received a letter from Ms. Heidi 
Thompson, the Manager of Medical Staff services, confirming that his application for 
privileges at the University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics had been approved.  It was 
documented that: “Your reappointment/appoint is for the period:  10/02/2013 to 
10/01/2015” and the “Category: Active Status:  Provisional Division:  Emergency 
Medicine Department: SURGERY”. R. at 00049.   
15. During her deposition, the Rule 30(b)(6) University representative, Ms. Lisa 
Hooper, who is the present Manager of the Medical Staff Offices and Business Operations 
Manager, testified that after November 19, 2013, when Dr. Martin received that letter of 
appointment to the UUHC, that the medical Bylaws applied to him. R. at 02835 – 02836.  
Ms. Hooper also agreed that under the provision in subsection 5.D.5, of the Bylaws, at page 
52, it does not contemplate a circumstance where for some reason the applicant would be 
given clinical privileges before the faculty appointment. R. at 02886.  
16. In December of 2013, Dr. Martin was offered the second, or “split” position 
on the faculty in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery at the 
University of Utah, within the School of Medicine.  Dr. Martin’s appointment offer was as 
an Associate Professor and Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control Center, in the 
Clinical Track beginning July 1, 2014.  The second offer letter stated in pertinent part, 





You need a confirmed academic appointment through the School of 
Medicine and medical credentialing approval through University Hospital.  
We will send you instructions regarding your responsibility in obtaining 
the necessary documents for your academic appointment; Utah medical 
license; DEA license, and medical credentialing that must be completed 
according to the timeline set by the department. … Your initial salary will be 
$252,000 plus benefits …  This salary is guaranteed for the first twelve 
months after which you will be included in the Division of Emergency 
Medicine Faculty Performance Incentive Plan beginning July 2015. … As 
a clinical faculty member in the Clinical Track you will be asked to fulfill a 
minimum of 48 clinical shifts per year (average 4 shifts per month) in the 
emergency department with the remainder of your responsibilities as 
Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control Center. 
 
R. at 00051 – 00053. 
 
17. Dr. Martin accepted the second offer on February 26, 2014. See Id.    
18. Based on the prior representations by Dr. Barton, the anticipated completion 
date for the hiring process on the second position was between April and June of 2014.  R. 
at 01802.   
19. Also, the deposition testimony of Ms. Hooper reflected that there should have 
been a separate set of instructions issued from either the Department of Surgery or the 
Division of Emergency Medicine to Dr. Martin regarding his second faculty appointment 
application, with a letter that explained the timelines, and the separate nature of the 
departments and that they could not share information.  R. at 02839 – 02840.    
20. On January 21, 2014, Dr. Martin received an e-mail from Ms. Bryce (who 
already had his full faculty appointment from October with the same three letters of 
reference), asking about 2 references, which he responded to, and then he received another 
e-mail near the end of February from Ms. Peacock, with follow-up on March 28, and April 





at 00011 - 00012.  None of those e-mails sent provided a timeline for when Dr. Martin’s 
second faculty application was due. See Id.  
21. During the early months of 2014, Dr. Martin had at least twenty-six (26) 
mutual e-mail exchanges, with four (4) or five (5) additional text messages also sent to Dr. 
Townes by Dr. Martin regarding the reference letter needing to be on letterhead.  R. at 
00012.  
22. What Dr. Martin did not know was that, in the beginning of April of 2014, 
two things happened internally within the University.  First, Dr. Barton announced he was 
leaving to move to California and the Department of Surgery were reviewing the Division 
of Emergency Medicine’s budget because there had been cuts to funding, and there was 
scrutiny of all new hires.  Before Dr. Barton left, he was asked to make a proposed budget 
for the upcoming year, incorporating any reductions he could.  On the matrix for the Budget 
for the Division of Emergency Medicine, Dr. Martin was not included on the 2014/2015 
Schedule (unlike Dr. Barton or Dr. Madsen, who were included but whose names were 
stricken out).  Also, for the first time, the Division of Emergency Medicine was going to 
be contributing 25% towards the salary of the Medical Director of the Utah Poison Control 
Center starting on July 1, 2014, a commitment made by Dr. Barton, who was no longer 
staying.  R. at 00012 – 00013.  
23. Dr. Brixner, the Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, testified in her 
deposition, that she: “knew that [the Division of Emergency Medicine] had some budget 
constraint concerns, which was another – going to be another concern was whether they 





24. Also, during his deposition, Dr. Hartsell admitted that he inherited budget 
cuts when he came on as the Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine in late spring 
of 2014, and further, when asked about an e-mail that Dr. Crouch sent in September of 
2014 to Dr. Brixner and others (two months after Dr. Martin had left) regarding the 
Emergency Department not being willing to pay any portion of the salary of the medical 
director or providing any clinical shifts in September of 2014, and whether anything had 
changed from July 1, 2014 and September, Dr. Hartsell stated:  “A.  I think by that time 
we realized how tight we were, and so there was nothing available clinically at the 
University Hospital to provide the ability to do clinical work in our Emergency 
Department.” R. at 02366.   
25. Only on April 21, 2014, for the first time, and shortly after the e-mails 
scrutinizing the budget, was Dr. Martin put on written notice by Dr. Barton that if he did 
not complete two final things (within only 4 days) or by April 25, 2014, on his credentialing 
application packet, that his “packet will not be approved and you will not have your clinical 
appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, or be able to 
work in our ED starting in July.” R. at 00262. 
26. On April 23, 2014, Dr. Martin responded to Dr. Barton to inform him that 
his CV had been submitted in the proper format, one letter of reference on letterhead was 
submitted, and the other two were promised and that would fulfill all outstanding 
requirements.  R. at 00263.  The administrative assistant whom Dr. Martin had been 
working with confirmed in a subsequent email to Dr. Martin that she had timely submitted 





27. On April 30, 2014, Dr. Martin received a positive e-mail notifying him and 
other staff members of his approved provider status.  That e-mail indicated that as of April 
28, 2014, Dr. Martin, as a provider in the “Surgery/Emergency Medicine” Department, was 
granted “added inpatient admission privileges and toxicology consultation privileges.” 
R. at 00268.   
28. On May 6, 2014, Paula Peacock, Administrative Assistant to Dr. Barton, sent 
an e-mail to both Dr. Hartsell and Dr. Barton.  Ms. Peacock stated that: “I heard from 
Academic Affairs this morning.  Yesterday, they spoke with Phyllis Vetter, in General 
Counsel.  If Dr. Martin has failed to provide the necessary documents in order to submit 
his file in to meet the deadline, then you would be able to cancel his offer for an 
appointment.” Then Ms. Peacock went on and concluded her e-mail with the statement: 
“If the decision is to go forward with his appointment, he still needs one external letter on 
stationary.  His start date would be August 1st.” R. at 00272.   
29. On May 13, 2013, Dr. Martin received a notification from the Manager of 
Medical Staff Services that upon the recommendation of the Credentials Committee and 
approval of the Medical Board and Hospital Board, his additional privileges had been 
approved for inpatient consultation privileges. R. at 00297.  Dr. Martin was also scheduled 
to work shifts starting in June of 2014.  R. at 00270.   
30. Later that same day, on May 13, 2014, Dr. Martin received a separate email 
from Dr. Barton addressing that there remained a problem with Dr. Martin’s file.  Dr. 
Martin took immediate steps that same day to try to correct the situation. R. at 00109.  Dr. 





him and he thought everything had been completed in a timely manner.  In fact, Dr. Martin 
was not aware that an extension had been granted to May 3rd until the litigation occurred.   
31. It came to light that one letter of reference apparently was not produced on 
letterhead by Dr. Townes through no fault of Dr. Martin, but everything else had been 
completed. R. at 00462. Ms. Peacock provided a self-serving declaration addressing a 
requirement regarding letterhead, yet attached to her declaration was a checklist, and 
nowhere on that checklist was such a requirement stated.  R. 02759 – 2764.  Apparently, 
Dr. Martin’s reference, Dr. Townes, thought he had already provided the updated letter to 
the Department of Surgery and was confused due to the multiple letters of reference that 
he had already sent on Dr. Martin’s behalf for his position.  Accordingly, on May 13, 2014, 
Dr. Townes apologized to Dr. Martin and re-sent the letter on the letterhead in an e-mail of 
May 15, 2014.  R. at 00462.  As a result, any issue with Dr. Martin’s application had been 
corrected, at the latest, by May 15, 2014. R. at 00273.   
32. Although Dr. Martin tried to find out how he could fix the issue, or at least 
explain what had happened, no one was willing to meet with him.   
33. During his deposition, Dr. Barton testified that the reason that Dr. Martin was 
not accepted was actually because he didn’t think Dr. Martin would be a good fit, based on 
the e-mail interactions that his two assistants had had with Dr. Martin, and specifically with 
Ms. Paula Peacock.  However, Dr. Barton admitted that Dr. Martin was never told that the 
denial was related to any purported interactions between himself and the assistants.  R. 
02519 – 02520.  Although Dr. Barton said that it was a group decision not to move forward 





input, as well as Dr. Finlayson, the Chair of the Department of Surgery that occurred at a 
meeting with others, during his subsequent deposition, Dr. Finlayson did not recall the 
details of that meeting.  R. at 02725.   
34. On May 27, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from Dr. Hartsell indicating 
that his faculty appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, had not proceeded 
successfully in a timely manner and his file was rejected, and that his School of Medicine 
(“SOM”) faculty appointment process had been terminated as of that date. R. at 00114.   
35. On May 28, 2014, Dr. Martin also received an e-mail from Ms. Thompson 
indicating that his privileges and medical staff appointment apparently were terminated as 
of the May 27, 2014 letter because it was a purported “error” on the Medical Staff Offices 
part to have issued those privileges to Dr. Martin under the Medical Bylaws. R. at 01339.  
36. On May 30, 2014, Dr. Martin wrote to the Dean of the College of Pharmacy 
to try and see if there was anything else he could do to stay on with his employment.  The 
Dean forwarded the e-mail on to Dr. Brixner, whose response was unforgiving and she 
stated that it was already predetermined that: “[Dr. Crouch] plans to end his contract June 
30th and go back to OR taking their on calls until she finds a new MD Director.” R. at 
00018 – 00019.  
37. On June 2, 2014, Dr. Martin was able to meet with Dr. Hartsell, and Dr. 
Hartsell indicated he would have no problem with Dr. Martin continuing on as the Medical 
Director while having his primary privileges through Occupational Medicine/Family 
Medicine, yet when Dr. Martin followed up with Occupational Medicine, the offer to meet 





38.  On June 2, 2014, Dr. Crouch also had a phone call with Dr. Hartsell and then 
sent an e-mail to Dean Ireland and Dr. Brixner, further discouraging either of them from 
permitting Dr. Martin to continue on at the University. R. at 00019.  
39. Dr. Brixner, the Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, testified that 
even if Dr. Martin would have gotten a faculty appointment with the Department of 
Occupational and Family Medicine, who initially was very interested in working with Dr. 
Martin, it would not have supported her “strategy”.  Dr. Brixner did not support that 
appointment: “Because it’s not our strategy.  It wasn’t what we wanted.  We wanted to 
work with the School of Medicine and the Department of Emergency Medicine.” R. at 
02672.  
40. On June 25, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from the College of Pharmacy 
indicating that they were aware that Dr. Martin had not obtained an academic appointment 
and they did not have an acceptable alternative because of the other requirements for 
accreditation from the AAPCC.  R. at 00121.   
41. On July 9, 2014, Dr. Martin received a letter from the Medical Staff Services 
indicating that the Board had acknowledged Dr. Martin’s “resignation” from the Active 
staff effective “5/27/2014 and that the following reason was given for your resignation: 
Termination by Department.” The letter from the University contained improper 
mischaracterizations of Dr. Martin’s employment. R. 00123.  
42. Based on the University’s actions, Dr. Martin asserted that the University 
violated its own Policies and Procedures.  Dr. Martin relied upon Section 6-300, University 





faculty members have legal rights and privileges and faculty members are entitled to “due 
process” when substantial sanctions are considered.  R. at 00022 – 00023.    
43. Finally, Dr. Martin asserted that the University also violated their Medical 
Bylaws in two parts; first regarding its Credentialing Policies, where the University failed 
to give Dr. Martin the adequate time to correct any purported issue with the faculty 
appointment application that was submitted to the Division of Emergency Medicine, within 
the School of Medicine (which the Bylaws apply to); and second, the University violated 
its Bylaws when it indicated that it was terminating Dr. Martin’s privileges and medical 
staff appointment, which requires, at a minimum, some basic due process, given that the 
termination occurred purportedly based on a negligent and unilateral error committed by 
the University in prematurely issuing Dr. Martin his clinical privileges and medical staff 
appointment. R. at 00021 – 00027.    
Procedural History 
44. This case began in November of 2014 with a formal Notice of Claim.  R. at 
00170 – 00171.   
45. On April 10, 2015, Dr. Martin timely filed his Verified Complaint and Jury 
Demand in federal court under Case No.: 2:15-cv-00248.   An Answer was filed on June 
11, 2015, and the parties moved forward with full written discovery and ten (10) 
depositions were also taken.  On July 12, 2016, Dr. Martin filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking a liability determination on all of his claims.9  On July 22, 2016, rather 
                                              





than file an opposition memorandum, the University filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and asserted immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment.10   
46. On August 29, 2016, after hearing oral argument on the University’s Motion, 
Judge Jenkins entered the Order11 with his ruling that all claims were dismissed, without 
prejudice.12  While Dr. Martin sought equitable relief, including his attorneys’ fees and 
costs, for having to respond to the University’s late motion, Judge Jenkins felt he no longer 
had jurisdiction to address that request, although he recognized the delayed nature of the 
University’s filing and Dr. Martin’s concerns.   
47. On September 28, 2016, Dr. Martin timely filed his Complaint in state court.  
Dr. Martin asserted six causes of action in his Complaint for: 1. Lack of Procedural Due 
Process under the Utah Constitution; 2. Lack of Procedural Due Process under the United 
States Constitution; 3. Breach of Contract; 4. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 5. 
Negligence; and 6. Injunctive Relief. R. 00001 – 00038.  
48. On October 20, 2016, Dr. Martin filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Liability against the University, and attached over one hundred and sixty pages (160) pages 
in supporting documents. R. 00166 – 00323.   
49. On November 21, 2016, the University filed a Motion to Dismiss.  R. 00327 
– 00349.  On May 1, 2017, oral argument was heard on the University’s Motion to Dismiss, 
                                              
10  See D.E. 33.  
11  See D.E. 44.  





where the trial court denied the University’s Motion on five of the six causes of action, but 
granted the University’s Motion as to the Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence, and 
dismissed it (while reserving whether it was with prejudice or not). R. 00881 – 00886.   
50. On June 23, 2017, the University filed its Joint Opposition to Dr. Martin’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the University’s Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 
01760 – 01852.  After full briefing on both Motions for Summary Judgment, the trial court 
heard oral argument on September 6, 2017.   
51. On September 26, 2017, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision.  R. 
03135 – 03145.  On October 24, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed his Notice of Appeal, which 
was received by the Utah Appellate Courts on October 25, 2017.  R. 03146 – 03148.   
52. On November 15, 2017, this Court issued a Sua Sponte Motion for Summary 
Disposition after it noted that a Final Order had not been submitted in this case.  On 
November 17, 2017, the Final Order was entered, (R. 03163 – 03165) and on November 
28, 2017, undersigned submitted a Response, after which this Court permitted briefing to 
proceed. 
Disposition of the Case in the Trial Court 
53. Dr. Martin and the University both moved for summary judgment before the 
trial court. R. 00166 – 00323 and 01760 - 01852.  
54. Dr. Martin filed a Joint Opposition Memorandum to the University’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, as well as a Reply in support of his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 02918 – 02958.  





that the University should be found liable on his due process, contractual, or injunctive 
relief, claims and denied Dr. Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability against 
the University.  R. 03135 - 03145.  In that same Memorandum Decision, the trial court then 
unfairly weighed and adopted the disputed facts and inferences in favor of University and 
granted the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which resulted in the 
dismissal of Dr. Martin’s claims with prejudice.   
56. Presently, Dr. Martin has moved the trial court to stay the proceedings, 
pending the outcome of this appeal. R. 03173 – 3187.   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Dr. Martin asserts that the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of review 
when addressing competing motions for summary judgment.  See Martin v. Lauder, 2010 
UT App 216, ¶¶ 7-8.  In addition, the trial court weighed the conflicting evidence, 
credibility of the witnesses, and interpreted the record in a manner that was unfairly skewed 
in favor of the University on its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which should not 
have been granted and constitutes grounds for reversal.  See Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT 
App 216, ¶ 14.  Not only did the trial court improperly assign weight to the conflicting 
evidence, but the trial court reached legal conclusions regarding whether a condition 
precedent had been fulfilled, which generally presents a questions of fact.  See Arata v. 
Shefco, 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 8.  In addition, the trial court incorrectly applied the law when 
it made a determination regarding where there was an offer versus a contract and in relation 
to Dr. Martin’s Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 





P.2d 49, 55 (1991).     
Finally, in failing to grant all inferences in favor of Dr. Martin, the trial court 
minimized the Declaration of Dr. Martin where Dr. Martin identified why the University 
correctly issued both a medical staff appointment and clinical privileges to him, in favor of 
Ms. Thompson’s testimony.  As a result, the trial court improperly determined that Dr. 
Martin did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his medical staff 
appointment or clinical privileges.  Moreover, the trial court also applied the law 
incorrectly regarding Spackman ex. rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000), as it related to Dr. Martin’s state constitutional rights.  Also, 
while Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue, in a federal context 
and under Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical Center, 938 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1158 (D. N.M. 
2012), it has been repeatedly held that a physician’s “[m]edical staff privileges embody 
such a valuable property interest that notice and hearing should be held prior to [their] 
termination or withdrawal[.]” See Id.   
 Given the multiple errors committed by the trial court, this Court should reverse the 
trial court’s holding in granting the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as 
reflected in its Memorandum Decision and Final Order, and remand with further 
instructions that permit Dr. Martin to move forward to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
 In this case, summary judgment was only appropriate if no genuine issue of material 
fact existed and the Defendants/Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  





Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64).  Dr. Martin asserts that there were numerous 
genuinely disputed material facts regarding key issues reflected in the record, where even 
if his Motion for Summary Judgment was correctly denied by the trial court, the existence 
of that conflicting evidence should have also mandated denial of the University’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment in this case.   
I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO APPLY THE CORRECT STANDARD 
IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MANDATES REVERSAL. 
Before reciting the facts in its Memorandum Decision, it was expected that the trial 
court would have included reference to the applicable standard of review in granting 
summary judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56(c), where a court must: “view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.”  See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (1983)(overruled on other 
grounds by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64).  The trial court failed to cite to 
either the Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 56 standard, or point out the slightly more complex review 
that needs to occur when there are competing dispositive motions. 
This Court has previously recognized, when faced with cross-motions for summary 
judgment, that: 
To be entitled to summary judgment, a party filing a cross-motion for 
summary judgment must establish its own entitlement to summary judgment 
rather than simply rely on the other party’s failure on its own motion … “it 
is not true that once both parties move for summary judgment the court is 
bound to grant it to one side or another” … typically “the denial of 
[plaintiffs’] motion for summary judgment only mean[s] the [plaintiffs] 
would have to prove their claim at trial”[]. 
 






 Dr. Martin concedes that the University stated the correct standard for review of 
cross-motions for summary judgment in its joint memorandum:   
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissipate factual 
issues, even though both parties contend ... that they are entitled to prevail 
because there are no material issues of fact.” … Rather, cross-motions may 
be viewed as involving a contention by each movant that no genuine issue of 
fact exists under the theory it advances, but not as a concession that no 
dispute remains under the theory advanced by its adversary. 
 
R. at 01818 – 01819 (internal citations omitted).     
 
 The University also points out that: “In effect, each cross-movant implicitly 
contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but that if the court determines 
otherwise, factual disputes exists which preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
the other side.” R. at 01819, See also Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT 216, ¶ 8.  Here, both 
parties asserted there were disputed facts, which should have precluded granting judgment 
in favor of the University.   
Review of the entire Memorandum Decision reveals that it is devoid of any 
reference to the correct standard of review, or recognition of how to resolve cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  R. at 03135 – 03145.  Accordingly, the trial court’s determinations 
understandably failed to consider the University’s Cross-Motion in the appropriate context, 
or review the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, (i.e. Dr. Martin), 
and that ultimately led to the incorrect granting of the University’s Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment.     
At a minimum, the factual determinations provided by “the defense” that Dr. Martin 





“The defense maintains that this letter [approving Dr. Martin’s application 
for privileges] was issued in error because the plaintiff did not have a faculty 
appointment in the School of Medicine or the Department of Surgery. 
(Deposition Exhibit 70).” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03136 (emphasis added).     
 
“The defense denies that the plaintiff’s CV was in the proper format.” R. 
03135 – 03145, at 03137 (emphasis added). 
   
“However, the defense maintains that this was past the April 25th or May 3rd 
deadlines that the plaintiff had been given and only after Dr. Barton had 
already informed the plaintiff of his failed application.” R. 03135 – 03145, 
at 03138 (emphasis added).  
 
“According to the defense, the plaintiff was not a faculty member of the 
School of Medicine and therefore should never have received privileges in 
the first place.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03138 (emphasis added).  
 
Each of the determinations referenced above were premised on a disputed fact 
identified by Dr. Martin, where the University presented an opposing view of, creating 
genuine issues, and where the trial court should not have granted the University’s Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment.  
II. THE TRIAL COURT’S DETERMINATIONS THAT DR. MARTIN’S 
ACTIONS “FAILED TO FULFILL THE FUNDAMENTAL CONDITIONS 
OF THE OFFER” SUCH THAT “THE CONTINGENCY DID NOT OCCUR, 
[AND] THE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE OFFER NEVER ROSE TO THE 
LEVEL OF A CONTRACT” WERE IMPROPER. 
Dr. Martin had two employment contracts, and the trial court’s statements that the 
December 2013 offer letter never rose to the level of a contract in this case, is an improper 
determination regarding the merits of the case that are better left to a jury.  
Generally, formation of a contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. …  … The obligations of the parties must be “set forth with 
sufficient definiteness that [the contract] can be performed.” … “The terms 
of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining 
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.” … “An 





reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable 
contract has been made.” … It “must unconditionally assent to all material 
terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance 
…”.13 
 
Here, the trial court took it upon itself to evaluate Dr. Martin’s contractual claims 
on the merits, which was not proper.  Moreover, not only did the trial court determine that 
the language in the second offer constituted condition precedents versus covenants or a 
breach, but then the trial court determined that any issues regarding the second contract 
(which Dr. Martin had corrected by May 15, 2014), constituted a failure to fulfill a material 
condition precedent, which was not proper.  Whether a material condition precedent exists, 
and then whether it has been fulfilled or not, is a question of fact better left for a jury to 
determine:  
“A condition is ‘an event, not certain to occur, which must occur ... before 
performance under a contract becomes due.’”… . Because “no duties arise 
between the contracting parties until the condition has been fulfilled,” id., 
failure of “‘a material condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to 
perform,’” … Whether a condition precedent was fulfilled generally 
presents a question of fact.  
 
See Arata v. Shefco, Ltd., 2014 UT App 148, ¶ 8 (internal citations omitted).    
 
At most, the terms of the second contract would have to be deemed ambiguous, or 
at a minimum, incomplete, when Dr. Martin was not provided any instructions or a deadline 
prior to the e-mail of Dr. Barton on April 21, 2014.   
Again, however, rather than view the facts in favor of Dr. Martin, the trial court 
made numerous factual determinations, to Dr. Martin’s detriment, that included:  
                                              





“By its very nature, the offer which was contingent upon the review and 
acceptance of a properly submitted application lacked mutuality and 
necessarily implied a right to decline the application … In this case, the 
plaintiff failed to fulfill the fundamental conditions of the offer submitting 
an application in the proper format and with the requisite corollary 
documents.  Given the notifications to the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the 
application process and his failure to fulfill the requirements by the stated 
deadline, the offer was effectively terminated or revoked.  Thus, since the 
contingency did not occur the School of Medicine offer never rose to the 
level of a contract.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03143.  
 
“Further, the plaintiff’s assertion that he was not provided with written 
instructions relative to the application process or an actual deadline is clearly 
contradicted by the record showing that he was repeatedly contacted 
regarding his obligations in completing the application, the stated deadline(s) 
and the consequences of a failure to follow through.  The March and April, 
2014, correspondence between the plaintiff and the various individual 
defendants confirms that he was fully aware of the requirements and the 
deadlines, but nevertheless failed to comply, leading to a rejection of this 
application because it was incomplete.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03140.    
 
“As a corollary, where the plaintiff cannot assert a breach of contract claim, 
he is also barred from asserting his Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing []… Likewise, the plaintiff 
has not explained how his own failure to fulfill the School of Medicine 
conditional offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03144.   
 
The trial court should have construed the facts and all reasonable inferences taken 
therefrom in favor of Dr. Martin, including the inference that no matter what Dr. Martin 
did to correct the issues with the application, the University no longer wanted to have him 
as the Medical Director of the UPCC, now that Dr. Barton was leaving, and because the 
Division of Emergency Medicine did not want to pay any portion of his salary and no 
longer had shifts to provide for him within the Emergency Department.  Moreover, whether 
the small oversight by a third party regarding putting a letter on letterhead should be 





Once Dr. Martin completed the requirements needed to fulfill all of the terms of the 
second offer, or by May 15, 2014, that created a contract, where the University then had 
an obligation to perform.  Instead, the evidence reflects that the University rescinded the 
contract, and came up with the claim that Dr. Martin’s privileges and medical staff 
appointment were issued in error based on a revisionist theory, and which the trial court 
adopted, again, to the detriment of Dr. Martin. 
While rescission or unilateral revocation is permitted in some circumstances, a party 
is “not entitled to rescission if [the] mistake occurred as a result of that party’s own 
negligence[].”  See Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1191 
(1993)(internal citations omitted).  In this case, the trial court claimed that Dr. Martin had 
failed to demonstrate how his own “failure to fulfill the School of Medicine conditional 
offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing[.]”  Yet, the trial court 
ignored the fact that Dr. Martin did complete the application, and could have started in his 
second position in the Division of Emergency Medicine starting on August 1, 2014, but for 
the fact that the University did not want to fulfill the terms of the contract, and so 
unilaterally rescinded the contract to the unfair surprise and harm of Dr. Martin.  The 
University’s unconscionable actions should not be permitted.  
Finally, under St. Benedicts Development Company v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 811 
P. 2d 194, 199 (1991), it is well recognized that: “In this state, a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships.” Here, a contractual 
relationship was created between the parties with the execution of the first contract in 





2014.  The conduct and dealings of the parties should be considered, where given that Dr. 
Martin had been there for numerous months, that the University should have acted in good 
faith prior to terminating his employment and rescinding the second employment offer 
under the pretext of a failure to obtain an academic appointment, particularly when the 
record reflects that he did fulfill all components of it, apart from a de minimus oversight by 
a third party, that he quickly had corrected as soon as he became aware of the issue.  
III. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS IN DETERMINING 
THAT DR. MARTIN DID NOT HAVE A PROTECTED PROPERTY, OR 
LIBERTY, INTEREST IN EITHER OF HIS FACULTY POSITIONS OR 
MEDICAL PRIVILEGES SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT PROCEDURAL 
DUE PROCESS. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has identified a two-part test to evaluate procedural due 
process claims:  
Procedural due process claims are evaluated under a two-part test.  The first 
question is “whether the [complaining party] has been deprived of a protected 
interest” in property or liberty. … If the court finds deprivation of a protected 
interest, we consider whether the procedures at issue comply with due 
process.[] 
 
See Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 48 (internal 
citations omitted).   
 
 Under the first prong of the due process analysis, the trial court should have applied 
the facts in the record to the due process standard to make a determination on whether the 
University failed to meet the due process standard.  The trial court should have done so, in 
the light most favorable regarding whether the termination of Dr. Martin’s employment as 
a faculty member and revocation of his medical staff appointment and clinical privileges 





 The trial court absolutely did not apply the facts and all reasonable inferences in 
favor of Dr. Martin, where the trial court made factual determinations against Dr. Martin 
supporting the University’s decision not to accept his faculty appointment application, even 
once complete, and rescission of the second contract with the Department of Surgery, in 
addition to reiterating the defense’s assertion that Dr. Martin was granted his medical staff 
appointment and privileges prematurely, such that the University could terminate both 
terms of employment early without due process.   
 The trial court held that: “Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have the required 
academic appointment and was therefore not entitled to continued enjoyment of the 
medical staff privileges which were prematurely granted.” R. 03135 – 03145, at 03142.  
“Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have a right to a School of Medicine faculty appointment 
and did not have a right to continued employment beyond the term of the first agreement.  
He has therefore suffered no deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest.” 
R. 03135 – 03145, at 03140.  
The trial court’s application of facts in favor of the University, was clearly 
erroneous, and Dr. Martin contested the facts underlying the trial court’s determinations in 
his Joint Memorandum in Opposition to the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Liability. R. at 02918 – 02958.  
Although, Dr. Martin acknowledges that Utah Courts have not held specifically that 
a physician holds a protected property interest in his or her medical staff appointment and 





law, which can be viewed as persuasive as to the presumption that physicians practicing in 
the State of Utah should also have a recognized and protected property interest in their 
privileges:   
The Eleventh, Sixth, and Fifth Circuits have explicitly held that a physician 
has a constitutionally-protected property interest in medical-staff privileges 
where the hospital's bylaws detail an extensive procedure to be followed 
when corrective action or suspension or reduction of these privileges is going 
to be taken. See Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1989) 
(holding that a physician has a “constitutionally-protected property interest 
in medical staff privileges”); Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016, 1022–27 (6th 
Cir.1987); Northeast Ga. Radiological Assoc. v. Tidwell, 670 F.2d 507, 511 
(5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (“Medical staff privileges embody such a valuable 
property interest that notice and hearing should be held prior to [their] 
termination or withdrawal, absent some extraordinary situation where a valid 
government or medical interest is at stake.”). The Tenth Circuit has noted 
this property interest in at least one case in which the parties conceded the 
interest exists. See Setliff v. Mem'l Hosp. of Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384, 
1395 (10th Cir.1988).14 
 
Furthermore, Dr. Martin respectfully disagrees with the trial court’s analysis under 
Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533 (Utah 
2000),  that the medical staff membership and clinical privileges extended to Dr. Martin, 
once revoked, cannot constitute a “flagrant” violation of his constitutional rights.  In July 
of 2014, Dr. Martin lost his membership within the Hospital, employment as the Medical 
Director at the UPCC, and received a letter that he was “Terminated by his Department”, 
the ramifications of which can be career ending for a physician in a similarly situated 
position.  Despite that, the trial court refused to recognize that nowhere in the record did 
the University ever indicate that it was opting not to renew Dr. Martin’s contracts. 
                                              






Moreover, the trial court refused to grant any of the inferences in Dr. Martin’s favor 
that the minor technicality in failing to get one letter of reference on letterhead, or short 
delay in completion of Dr. Martin’s fourth application, was actually just an excuse to 
unilaterally rescind the second contract the University had entered into with Dr. Martin 
(because the Division of Emergency Medicine needed to make a budget cut somewhere 
and with Dr. Barton leaving, his prior idea of having a joint program with the UPCC was 
no longer desired), which deprived Dr. Martin of the opportunity to work at the University 
for another year.   
As a result, the trial court resolved the factual disputes in favor of the University on 
Dr. Martin’s procedural due process claims in a way that was clearly erroneous, and where 
Dr. Martin has met his higher burden, this Court should reverse the trial court as to his First 
and Second Causes of Action, and permit him to move forward to trial on the same.   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling that 
granted the University’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2018. 
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      /s/ Julia D. Kyte   
      Julia D. Kyte 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. MARTIN, M.D., 
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vs. 
THE UNIVERISTY OF UTAH; THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COLLEGE OF 
PHARMACY; UTAH POISON CONTROL 
CENTER; BARBARA CROUCH, in her official 
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BARTON, in his official and individual 
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FINLAYSON, in his official and individual 
capacities; HEIDI THOMPSON, in her official 
and individual capacities; PAULA PEACOCK, 
in her official and individual capacities; and 




CASE NO. 160906038 
Judge Andrew H. Stone 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on September 6, 2017, in connection with the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendants' cross Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant 
legal authorities and counsel's oral argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
The material facts in this case may be organized in the order of chronology. On August 2, 2013, the 
plaintiff was sent a letter signed by defendant Barbara Crouch, the Executive Director of the Utah Poison Control 
Center ("UPCC"), and defendant Diana Brixner, Chair of the Department of Pharmacotherapy, stating: 
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I a.-n pleased to offer you the position of Medical Director, Utah Poison Control Center with a 
faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy at the rank of Associate Professor (Clinical). This 
position will start at 0.75 FTE funded by the Utah Poison Control Center with a transition to a split 
position with your primary academic appointment in the Division of Emergency Medicine, 
Department of Surgery, to start July l, 2014. 
(Deposition Exhibit 18). The plaintiff"accepted" by signing the letter on August 2, 2013 . 
An August 15, 2013, letter to the plaintiff confirmed the need for final approval of the President and Board 
of Trustees of the University of Utah. The letter also specified that the initial term of appointment was from October 
1, 2013 until June 30, 2014, and that the appointment was to "automatically renew each year thereafter for 
successive terms of one (1) year unless either [the plaintiff] or the University gives written notice to the other of its 
intent not to renew [the plaintiffs] appointment." The plaintiff accepted this letter on August 22, 2013. 
The plaintiff then relocated from Seattle, Washington, in the fall of2013 and purchased a residence in Salt 
Lake City. On September 6, 2013, the plaintiff obtained his medical licenses in the State of Utah, and started as the 
Medical Director of the UPCC on October 1, 2013. The plaintiff's application for medical credentials to practice in 
the University of Utah Hospital was approved on or about October 9, 2013. A November 12, 2013, letter from the 
President of the University of Utah, sent to the plaintiff, advised him that the "the University's Board of Trustees has 
approved your appointment in the full-time clinical track as Associate Professor (Clinical) of Pharmacotherapy, 
effective October 1, 2013 and ending June 30, 2014." 
On November 19, 2013, defendant Heidi Thompson, Manager of Medical Staff Services, sent a letter to the 
plaintiff stating: "I am pleased to inform you that upon the recommendations of the Credentials Committee and 
approval of the Medical Hospital Boards, your application for privileges at the University of Utah Hospitals and 
Clinics has been ~pproved ... Your reappointment/appointment is for the period: 10/02/2013 to 10/01/2015. 
Category: Active. Status: Provisional. Division: Emergency Medicine. Department: Surgery." The defense 
maintains that this letter was issued in error because the plaintiff did not have a faculty appointment in the School of 
Medicine or the Department of Surgery. (Deposition Exhibit 70). 
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In a letter, dated December 3, 2013, but not received by the plaintiff until February of2014, defendant Erik 
Barton, Chief of the Division of Emergency Medicine, and defendant Samuel Finlayson, Chair of the Department of 
Surgery, offered the plaintiff "a position on the faculty in the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of 
Surgery at the University of Utah School of Medicine." (Deposition Exhibit 72). The letter details the approval 
process for the offer of appointment and states that the initial term of appointment "is intended to begin on July 1, 
2014." 
On January 23, 2014, Becky Brice, an administrative assistant in the Department of Surgery sent the 
following email to the plaintiff: "Because of your faculty rank, you need three outside the institution letters. You 
currently have two from Drs. Townes and Cummins. Would you please solicit one more? Thanks. If you would have 
sent to my attention that would be preferable." 
On March 28, 2014, and April 4, 2014, defendant Paula Peacock, an assistant within the Department of 
Surgery, emailed the plaintiff and asked him to call Ors. Townes and Hurley to instruct them to print their letters on 
letterhead. 
On April 21, 2014, Dr. Barton sent an email to the plaintiff indicating that there were deficiencies in his 
application materials. Dr. Barton informed the plaintiff that if he did not complete two aspects of his credentialing 
application by April 25, 2014, his "packet will not be approved and you will not have your clinical appointment in 
the Division of Emergency Medicine, Department of Surgery, or be able to work in our ED starting in July." The 
April 25th deadline was subsequently extended to May 3•d. 
The plaintiff responded to Dr. Barton on April 23, 2014, informing him that his CV had been submitted in 
the proper format, one letter of reference on letterhead was submitted, and the other two were promised to fulfill all 
outstanding requirements. The defense denies that the plaintiffs CV was in the proper format. 
On May 13, 2014, Dr. Barton informed the plaintiff that his credentialing packet was not successful. The 
defense asserts that the plaintiff failed to obtain all of the required letters of recommendation, in the proper format, 
by the designated deadline. 
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On May 15, 2014, the plaintiff sent a letter of recommendation on letterhead from Dr. Townes. However, 
the defense maintains that this was past the April 25 111 or May 3rd deadlines that the plaintiff had been given and only 
after Dr. Barton had already informed the plaintiff of his failed application. 
On May 28, 2014, the plaintiff received an email from Ms. Thompson indicating that his privileges and 
medical staff appointment were terminated as of May 27, 2014. According to the defense, the plaintiff was not a 
faculty member of the School of Medicine and therefore should never have received privileges in the first place. 
The plaintiff-seeknummaryjudgment on-his remaining·five-caus~s ofaction-:- With-respecno the-First and- -
Second Causes of Action, the plaintiff asserts that he was deprived of procedural due process under Article 1, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution and that the defendants violated the Procedural Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution. The latter claim is being brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action allege that the defendants breached each of the plaintiffs three contracts for employment and that 
they acted in bad faith by depriving the plaintiff from continued employment at the University of Utah. Finally, in 
his Fifth Cause of Action, the plaintiff asserts that the individual defendants acted with fraud and malice when they 
negligently published certain documents concerning him. The plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is a request for 
injunctive relief relative to the alleged publication of negative information. The defense has responded in seeking 
summary judgment on these same causes of action. The Court will address each of plaintiffs claims in tum. 
The first issue before this Court is whether the defendants violated Article l, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution in denying the plaintiff his procedural due process rights. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants 
deprived him of procedural due process rights with respect to (1) his ability to continue in his faculty appointment in 
the Department of Pharmacotherapy and as Medical Director of the UPCC; (2) the revocation of his medical 
privileges; and (3) the determination that he failed to submit a timely, complete application to achieve a School of 
Medicine faculty appointment. 
Notably, in their Opposition to the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the defense asserts that based 
on the allegations of the Complaint, the plaintiff has limited his state due process claim to the alleged deprivation of 
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only his medical staff privileges and not his employment. The plaintiff counters that the defendants' interpretation 
of the Complaint is too narrow. According to the plaintiff, he has claimed that the defendants failed to provide him 
due process with respect to his employment and faculty status when they violated the Medical Staff Bylaws and 
Policies for the UUHC. 
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court notes that Paragraph 82 specifically alleges that "[the] Defendants 
engaged in deliberate actions that deprived Dr. Martin of his medical staff privileges at the University of Utah that 
he obtained on November 19, 2013. Dr. Martin's medical staff privileges are a recognized property interest subject 
to state constitutional due process protections." (Complaint at para. 82). However, a broader view of the Complaint 
suggests that the plaintiff is also alleging a due process claim relating to a prospective faculty appointment with the 
School of Medicine and continued employment with the Department of Pharmacotherapy. The Court therefore 
examines the alleged due process deprivations with respect to both the plaintiff's medical staff privileges and 
prospective/future employment. 
The plaintiffs employment-based due process claims rest on an alleged series of employment contracts 
and the Bylaws. However, as discussed in more detail below, the plaintiffs due process claims based on 
prospective or future employment can only be based upon (1) a contract pertaining to the plaintiffs position of 
Medical Director of the UPCC with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy, and (2) a qualified and 
conditional offer to achieve a School of Medicine faculty appointment upon the successful submission and 
acceptance of an application. As to the latter, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs application was incomplete as of 
the April 25th or May 3rd deadlines established by Dr. Barton. Ms. Peacock's unrebutted deposition testimony as 
well as the docwnentary evidence before the Court establish that the plaintiff was required to provide three letters of 
reference on letterhead prior to these deadlines and that he failed to provide a third compliant letter until May 15, 
2014. 
Further, the plaintiff's assertion that he was not provided with written instructions relative to the 
application process or an actual deadline is clearly contradicted by the record showing that he was repeatedly 
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contacted regarding his obligations in completing the application, the stated dead!ine(s) and the consequences of a 
failure to follow through. The March and April, 2014, correspondence between the plaintiff and the various 
individual defendants confirms that he was fully aware of the requirements and the deadlines, but nevertheless failed 
to comply, leading to a rejection of his application because it was incomplete. 
Further, the plaintiffs position as Medical Director with a faculty position in the College of Pharmacy was 
the subject of the August 15, 2013, offer letter - the parties' first agreement. This agreement provides for automatic 
renewal each -yeai "unless eitller you or tlle Uiiiversify gives written notice to the other of its intent not to 
renew your appointments." (Emphasis added). It is undisputed that the University had the right and did exercise 
its option not to renew the plaintiff's positions on June 25, 2014. 
Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have a right to a School of Medicine faculty appointment and did not have 
a right to continued employment beyond the term of the first agreement. He has therefore suffered no deprivation of 
a constitutionally protected property interest. Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff is claiming a due process 
violation relative to his employment status, the Court grants the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court next addresses the plaintiff's due process claim regarding his medical staff privileges and 
whether the revocation of these privileges without providing him with a hearing amounts to a constitutional 
deprivation. The defense correctly points out that there are no Utah cases which recognize medical staff privileges 
to be constitutionally protected rights. The plaintiff has cited federal court cases recognizing that medical staff 
privileges embody a constitutionally protected property interest. See e.g. Osuagwu v. Gila Regional Medical 
Center, 938 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1158 (D. N.M. 2012). However, the presumption in these cases that a physician has a 
valuable property interest in such privileges is based on an underlying logical inference that the privilege was 
correctly and properly extended to the physician in the first place. 'W"nile the plaintiff maintains that medicai 
privileges were a mandated requirement for him to act as the Medical Director at the UPCC, Ms. Thompson has 
testified that the medical staff privileges granted by her department to the plaintiff was in error because the only 
faculty appointment that accompanied his medical staff application was the College of Pharmacy, Department of 
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Pharmacotherapy faculty appointment, and, according to the Bylaws, the plaintiff should not have had his 
privileging or credentialing approved without a School of Medicine faculty appointment. (Exhibit 6, Thompson 
Dep. at 65:10-11). Ms. Thompson's testimony and the controlling language of the Bylaws which requires a School 
of Medicine faculty appointment in advance of medical staff privileges being extended to a physician are unrefuted. 
Clearly, the plaintiffs privileges were granted prematurely when his right to the same was not yet vested because his 
faculty appointment in the School of Medicine was still subject to the application process and was not a fait 
accompli by any means. Thus, in contrast to the cases cited by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs interest in the medical 
privileges never rose to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest. 
As a corollary, under Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder Cty. Sch. Dist .. 16 P.3d 533 
(Utah 2000), the Court is not persuaded that the medical staff privileges extended to the plaintiff garnered 
constitutional due process protections such that the revocation of the same constitutes a "flagrant" violation of his 
constitutional rights. 1 In addition, where the plaintiff has asserted identical § 1983 and contract claims, he has 
established the existence of other avenues ofrelief, thus failing the second element of Spackman. 
Further, since the plaintiff cannot meet his burden under Spackman, his state law liberty interest claim 
similarly fails as a matter of law, assuming of course that an employee has a liberty interest in his reputation under 
the Utah Constitution.2 In addition, the plaintiff cannot maintain a claim that his reputation was harmed because of 
the revocation of privileges which were prematurely granted and could be revoked once the plaintiffs faculty 
appointment in the School of Medicine failed to materialize. The Court therefore grants summary judgment to the 
defense on the plaintiffs First Cause of Action in the entirety. 
1 
The Court notes that the plaintiff has not evaluated the elements of Spackman in any detail and has 
primarily focused only on the first element. 
2 
The Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to cite any legal authority that would support such a 
claim and the Court will not extend State v. Briggs, 199 P .3d 948 (Utah 2008), beyond its finding of a 
liberty interest under the United States Constitution. 
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As to the plaintiffs Second Cause of Action, the defendants have asserted qualified immunity. Under 
Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009), "[w]hen a defendant asserts qualified immunity at 
summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, 
and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established." (Citations omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis, the 
Court determines that the plaintiff has not met his burden in establishing a constitutional violation that was clearly 
established. To the contrary, as with his state constitutional due process claim, the plaintiff has not established a 
deprivation-of-hisdue process rights eitherin connection-with-his -continued employment-or-with-the-revocation-of 
his medical staff privileges. Ultimately, the plaintiff did not have the required academic appointment and was 
therefore not entitled to continued enjoyment of the medical staff privileges which were prematurely granted. 
Likewise, no due process rights attached to the plaintiffs employment which was subject to non-renewal at the 
option of the University prior to June 30, 2014. Finally, the plaintiffs claim of a federal liberty interest fails under 
the same standards set forth above. The Court therefore grants summary judgment on the plaintiffs Second Cause 
of Action. As a corollary, because the plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action is predicated on prevailing on the Second 
Cause of Action, the Court's determination in granting summary judgment on this claim also entitles the defense to 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs injunctive relief claim. 
Next, with respect to his Third Cause of Action, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants breached the 
Bylaws and two alleged employment contracts. Again, the first contract between the parties pertains to the 
plaintiff's position of Medical Director of the UPCC with a faculty appointment in the College of Pharmacy. Under 
this contract, the plaintiff was offered a one-year appointment with a transition to a split appointment with the 
School of Medicine. This transition and tenure with the School of Medicine, which was anticipated to occur on July 
1, 2014, ultimately failed because of the plaintiffs rejected application. Further, given this failure and under the 
express terms of the parties' agreement, the College of Pharmacy had the option to give written notice of its intent 
"not to renew the appointment," which it did on June 25, 2014. This option of non-renewal was unconditional and 
did not involve a disciplinary matter. Therefore, the College of Pharmacy's decision to not renew did not carry with 
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it a right to due process or peer judgment before the decision was made. To the contrary, the College of Pharmacy 
contract simply expired on its own terms. 
Next, the Court is unpersuaded by the plaintiffs position that the December 2013 offer from the School of 
Medicine culminated into a contract. By its very nature, the offer which was contingent upon the review and 
acceptance of a properly submitted application lacked mutuality and necessarily implied a right to decline the 
application. In addition, the submission of an application was no mere formality and its approval, which was clearly 
discretionary, was integral to gaining a faculty appointment. In this case, the plaintiff failed to fulfill the 
fundamental conditions of the offer of submitting an application in the proper format and with the requisite corollary 
documents. Given the notifications to the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the application process and his failure to 
fulfill the requirements by the stated deadline, the offer was effectively terminated or revoked. Thus, since the 
contingency did not occur, the School of Medicine offer never rose to the level of a contract. 
Further, the plaintiff's reliance on the Bylaws in asserting that he should have been given 30 days' advance 
notice that his application would be rejected is misplaced. The Bylaws have no application to the faculty 
appointment process, but rather apply strictly to medical staff privileges. 
Finally, the third contract allegedly breached is the Bylaws. The plaintiff again asserts that the defendants' 
actions in automatically revoking his privileges without a hearing constitutes a breach of the Bylaws. However, as 
discussed in the Court's analysis above, where the privileges were granted prematurely in the first place, prior to the 
plaintiff being granted a faculty appointment through the School of Medicine, he was not entitled to a hearing under 
the Bylaws when the privileges were subsequently revoked. Having failed to obtain a faculty appointment, the 
plaintiff had no vested entitlement in the privileges and the revocation of the same cannot constitute a breach of the 
Bylaws. Based on the foregoing, the Court rules that having failed to establish a breach of the two contracts and the 
Bylaws, the plaintiff's Third Cause of Action fails as a matter of law. The Court grants summary judgment to the 
defendants on this cause of action. 
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As a corollary, where the plaintiff cannot assert a breach of contract claim, he is also barred from asserting 
his Fourth Cause of Action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ~ Brehany v. 
Nordstrom. Inc .• 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) (The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be read to 
establish new, independent rights or duties to which the parties did not agree ex ante). In addition, the plaintiff has 
not sufficiently articulated a theory as to why the defendants acted in bad faith in opting to not renew the Pharmacy 
contract. Likewise, the plaintiff has not explained how his own failure to fulfill the School of Medicine conditional 
offer would implicate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment 
on this cause of action as well. 
Finally, in the absence of liability under each of the foregoing causes of action, the Court denies the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a liability determination against the defendants in their personal 
capacity under the plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. While the defense has moved for summary judgment in the 
entirety, the Court could not locate any specific legal argument on the plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action. Therefore, 
while denying the plaintiffs Motion in this regard, the Court cannot grant the defendants' Motion on this cause of 
action. 
Counsel for the defense is to prepare an Order consistent with this Memorandum Decision and submit the 
same to the Court for review and signature. 
Dated this £ c, 1~ay of September, 2017. 
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 160906038 
Judge Andrew H. Stone 
On September 6, 2017, this court held a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendants' cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties presented 
argument and this court issued a memorandum decision on September 26, 2017. Based upon the 
reasoning and decision set forth in the Court's September 26, 2017 memorandum decision, the 
Court hereby orders that Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment is granted1 as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs first cause of action for denial of due process under the Article 1, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution is dismissed with prejudice; 
2. Plaintiff's second cause of action for denial of due process under the Procedural 
Due Process clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 
dismissed with prejudice; 
3. Plaintiffs third cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice, 
4. Plaintiffs fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of food faith and fair 
dealing is dismissed with prejudice; and 
5. Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for injunctive relief is dismissed with prejudice. 
The court further orders that based on its prior May 22, 2017 order, Plaintiffs fifth cause 
of action is dismissed with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 
1 Defendant did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs fifth cause of action. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Isl Julia D. Kvte 
JULIA D. KYTE 
STIRBAPC 
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